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PREAMBLE

O

ur world changed drastically on February 11th 2020 when the World Health Organization
announced the name of the new coronavirus disease as COVID-19, and the pandemic was
later considered the greatest challenge we have faced since World War II. Although we have
started to experience social life in various new ways, the impacts that it will bring are still
unknown. In recent years, migration had already undergone different transformations globally, and
more changes are expected. How will populations on the move and migrant populations live in the
following years post-COVID, and how different actors will respond to these changes, is yet to be seen.
The Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies at El Colegio de México has worked over
the last three years on better understanding the different dimensions of inequality associated to migration, and how public policy mediates these processes. Facing this new context, we decided to generate an academic discussion, albeit accessible to the general public, to apprise how COVID-19 will
impact different dimensions of migration processes, and reflect on what would be needed to address
these effects. In order to ponder these questions, we brought together the perspectives of a series of
binational experts from the academia, the public, social and private sectors, who deliver, on the one
hand, a discussion about the economic, political and social context, and on the other, considerations
on specific vulnerable mobile populations, as well as of support networks, and implications for policy
aimed at diminishing the negative effects of the pandemic. We hope that these two issues of our series
Notes on Migration and Inequalities will constitute a frame of reference to inform about the current
situation and generate proposals that will transcend this contingency.
CLAUDIA MASFERRER
Coordinator
Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies
El Colegio de México
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Old Challenges, Institutional Vacuums, and New Challenges
in Managing Migration Flows to Mexico
Silvia E. Giorguli | El Colegio de México

There have been recurring news stories about
the situation of international migrants around
the world in the news coverage of the pandemic.
These are not the ones that attract most attention precisely because one of the effects of this
health contingency has been the tendency to turn
towards the local, find the closest and most urgent needs and set global problems aside. Nevertheless, showcasing the situation international
migrants face in the pandemic will allow us to see
discrimination (in a moment in which the traveler, the migrant, the foreigner is seen as a potential
source of spread), overcrowding, and the poor
sanitary conditions of migrants and their families
in migration stations or centers, and the problems
they face in order to access health services –both
because their work situation doesn’t give them
access to benefits and possibly because their undocumented status prevents or inhibits them from
seeking medical assistance. At the same time, we
have seen several news stories about the role of
international migrants in areas such as caregiving
(for the elderly, for example) in contexts like the
European one, or their importance in agriculture
and in the food processing industry in the United
States. In the face of their recurrent vulnerability,
which has increased, the essential quality of their
silent presence also stands in contrast.
This is not a distant or alien problem to the
Mexican context. In fact, there are adversities related to the pandemic in each of the dimensions
of Mexico as a country of origin, of arrival, of
return, of transit or of refuge, as well as having
to do with the policies followed by the region’s
countries vis-à-vis the pandemic. At the time of
writing, the news story about the first death of
a Mexican national in a U.S. managed detention
center appeared. Likewise, we were surprised at
the beginning of the health contingency by the
news of violent acts in migration stations on the
southern border, or by images of vulnerability in
places where Central American immigrants await

the opportunity to cross “north,” whether because their asylum claim was accepted or because
they found another way to cross.
From the Mexican perspective, what we are
observing is the result of the vacuums, inefficiencies, and unresolved problems in migration management, mainly in our country, but also in the
United States. The health contingency exacerbated them; it reveals vulnerabilities more starkly. It
also puts forth the Mexican incapacity to define a
migration management strategy suitable with the
principles we have subscribed to through several
international agreements.
It is difficult to anticipate migration scenarios. At the same time, the challenges to manage
migration seem too big. Nevertheless, there are
aspects for which we can define concrete actions,
pondering the ways in which the health contingency has shown and increased international migrants’ vulnerabilities. Below, I selectively depict
three examples linked to different types of human
mobility in Mexico.

1. Return migration and access to health
The economic recession in the United States from
only ten years ago, combined with the current restrictive migration policy, generated an important
amount of returning Mexicans, the largest one in
decades. Mexico was not ready, and we observed
problems derived from lack of clear procedures
and bureaucratic obstacles that hindered migrants’
access to education and health services, work,
housing, and banking.1 The economic contingency expected after the emergency –accompanied by
the anti-immigrant climate favored by Trump’s
government- anticipates another important number of Mexican returnees to the country. This return will take place during a period of transition
in the Mexican health system. The Seguro Popular
insurance, which returning migrants could access
for 90 days, stopped operating and it is unclear
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how migrants can access the recently created
National Health and Wellness Institute (INSABI,
acronym in Spanish). We know a group of Mexicans returning to the country will require special
services for their chronic degenerative diseases2.
It is crucial to have a clear health access structure that anticipates the challenges and needs of
the population in the face of a recurring wave of
respiratory illnesses associated with COVID-19.

2. Migrant children and adolescents
One of the peculiarities of last decade’s migration flows is the presence of underage population.3 This is observed both in returning migrants
as well as in migrants in transit in Mexico, and
among asylum seekers here or in the U.S.A. Migrant children and adolescents travel accompanied by family members and sometimes alone.
There is a legal loophole in these cases that limits the possibility of protecting migrant children,
from the moment of their detention through the
management of procedures related to them –
whether for deportation or asylum. Concrete actions are required to protect the best interest of
the child by generating safe and adequate spaces
while their migratory situation is being determined, and that allows families to stay together.
Likewise, adequate attention is needed regarding
migrant children’s health needs –including considering preventive actions like vaccination.

3. Waiting time and life conditions during the
processing of migration documents in Mexico
and the United States
The crisis has displayed the precarious life conditions of migrants in transit through Mexico
and the vulnerability they face, especially during
health contingencies like the current one. There
are no adequate spaces in migration stations; in
many cases, they are overcrowded and overpopulated. In the case of migrants awaiting a resolution to their asylum claim to the United States,
they are often temporarily located in irregular
settlements in border cities. Concrete measures
are needed to reduce bureaucratic paperwork
and waiting times, both in Mexico and the United
States.4 Likewise, actions could be taken in order
to foster better living conditions in temporary settlements following examples and protocols from
other countries.
There is no doubt that the challenges Mexico faces in terms of migration management are
huge and are linked both to the country’s policies as well as to deficiencies and vacuums in the
U.S. migration system. Creative solutions which
can effectively break the accumulated inertias
in migration management are required. Perhaps
one could begin deconstructing the several problems and anticipate them as much as possible in
the different scenarios once the contingency is
over.

NOTES
1
2
3

4

S. Giorguli and A. Bautista, (in press), Derechos fragmentados: Acceso a derechos sociales y migración de retorno a
México, (México: El Colegio de México).
N. Castañeda-Camey, X. Castañeda, V. Díaz, C. Ruiz and Alonzo O. (in press). “Salud y derechos de los migrantes
mexicanos retornados: barreras, acciones y oportunidades,” in Derechos fragmentados: Acceso a derechos sociales y
migración de retorno a México eds. S. Giorguli and A. Bautista (México: El Colegio de México).
In the case of children coming from the Unites States to Mexico, see Zúñiga and Giorguli (2019) and Masferrer et al.
(2019). V. Zúñiga V. & S. Giorguli, Niñas y niños en la migración de Estados Unidos a México la generación 0.5. (México:
El Colegio de México, 2019). C. Masferrer, E. Hamilton and N. Denier, “Immigrants in Their Parental Homeland: Half a
Million U.S.-born Minors Settle Throughout Mexico,” Demography, 56 1453-1461, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-01900788-0.
Coria and Zamudio (2018) present a detailed analysis of Mexico’s legal framework and the challenges we face. E. Coria
and P. Zamudio, “Inmigrantes y refugiados ¿Mi casa es tu casa?,” Documentos de Política Migratoria, (México: Centro
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, 2018). https://migdep.colmex.mx/publicaciones/DPM-03.pdf. For the United
States, Meissner et al. (2018), define the system as “broken,” inoperative and not effective. D. Meissner, F. Hipsman, T.A.
Aleinikoff, (2018). “The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward,” (Washington D.C.: Migration Policy
Institute, 2018).
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The Pandemic and Migration Policies on the
Mexico-United States Border
Andrew Selee | Migration Policy Institute

The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed changes
on mobility at a global level, from the closing of
borders, flight prohibitions and visa restrictions
and access to asylum. With the purpose of limiting movement and promoting social distancing to
prevent the spread, many of these measures make
sense. But there are reasons to believe that in
some cases, including some decisions by the U.S.
government, these measures might become more
permanent or give way to other efforts to restrict
migration that President Trump’s administration
has wanted for a very long time. While it is still
difficult to distinguish between what’s necessary
due to the crisis and what could become permanent because of other political reasons, using the
crisis as an excuse, it’s worth starting to draw the
spheres in which we are seeing changes that could
last much longer than the epidemiological situation would suggest.
One of the strongest measures was the partial closure of the border to non-essential traffic.
This was agreed by the U.S. and Mexican governments, as well as by the U.S. and Canadian governments for their shared border, and it has a very
understandable logic to try and reduce traffic that
is not for work, education or medical purposes.
The difficulty about this measure lies in the fact
that much of the work transit happens outside
of official margins, so many Mexican workers
who live on the Mexican side work informally on
the U.S. side doing housework, landscaping, agriculture and in other sectors where informality
prevails. These workers, who cannot prove they
have a job on the other side of the border, are
currently unemployed and will depend on the future opening of mobility in the border. It’s likely
that this will happen when both countries start to
limit their social distancing measures, since it’s a
well thought measure, negotiated and implemented within the parameters of the pandemic.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s unilateral measure of returning undocumented migrants

and asylum seekers to Mexico, implemented for
health reasons, might last longer than the current
crisis. Instead of following regular detention procedures, the U.S. government announced that it
would use a little known health authority to return undocumented migrants and asylum seekers
and Central Americans directly to Mexico, without registering them as detainees or taking them
to a detention center. The Mexican government
accepted this measure (supposedly, under a lot of
pressure), but refused to receive nationals from
countries that were not from Central America
and Mexico. Now, the U.S. government returns
undocumented migrants in less than two hours,
an express process, and has no asylum facilities.
This measure can also be understood in the
midst of a pandemic. The risk of having thousands of migrants in detention centers was significant, and even though the risk is still latent on
the Mexican side, with returnees, it’s better than
a restricted space. But it is also likely that the U.S.
administration might have attained a goal for the
longer term which had nothing to do with the
pandemic, which is to eliminate access to the asylum system in the border and to stop almost all irregular crossings. I suspect that while COVID-19
lasts, this measure will be in force in the border,
even though other measures that restrict mobility
within the country and in the border will be suspended. To some of the U.S. President’s advisors,
the pandemic gave them what they yearned for:
a way to seal the border to illegal crossings and
eliminate the asylum process there.
The third measure, and another one that could
stay beyond the crisis, is the decision to pause
during two months the emission of permanent visas -green cards- to beneficiaries that are outside
the country and who are being claimed by relatives. It is a reduced number, with a few exceptions, and probably does not go beyond 52,000
affected people per month. In the short term,
the number of affected people is even less, since

Seminar Migration, Inequality and Public Policies / El Colegio de México

NOTES ON

6 / MIGRATION AND INEQUALITIES / NO.4

consulates have been closed and unable to process visas. Nevertheless, there are many possibilities that this measure is renewed beyond the
contemplated two months, therefore limiting new
legal entries to the country.
Since the majority of Mexicans that are going
to live in the United States these days do so legally, precisely through these permanent visas, it’s
very likely that this will have a bigger effect on
Mexican families living in the United States and
their families in Mexico, who are waiting to be
reunited with them north of the border. However,
the measure left out those who have been claimed
by their employers and temporary workers, which
suggests that the Trump administration sees those
who are going to the United States to work in a
very different way than those who are entering
for family reunification.
These are not the only migration measures
that have been taken in times of COVID-19, but
they are probably the three with the most impact

on the Mexico-U.S. border and migration between the two countries. While it is probable that
the measure that limits traffic along the border is
cancelled at some point, when the circumstances
allow, there are reasons to believe that the other
two measures, one with irregular crossings and
one with resident visas, might last much longer.
It should not surprise us that the leaders of
many countries will use the current crisis to justify measures in other areas of public policy that
were already on their agendas. These will not be
the only migration and other measures implemented for emergency reasons, but they will find
a certain higher permanence even when the crisis has decreased. Crises give government executives ample margin to act in favor of the common
good, but some of the measures turn out to be
less temporary than others. In this case, some of
the U.S. government’s temporary migration measures will probably have longer lives than the official reasons behind them.
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Employment and Migration in Mexico in Times of COVID-19
Liliana Meza | Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
Carla Pederzini | Universidad Iberoamericana

One of the main effects produced by the expansion of coronavirus in Mexico has been the decrease in economic activity and consequently, the
decrease in employment. Adding to the pandemic’s effect is the negative performance that both
the country’s economy and employment had already been experiencing. In January this year,
before the first COVID-19 case came up, the International Labour Organization (ILO) had already estimated an increase in unemployment in
2020 and 2021. Furthermore, economic activity
in Mexico decreased -0.1 in 2019, which means
there was already a decrease before the pandemic.
Since the spread of the virus in Mexico, social
distancing measures have been implemented in
order to minimize it. On March 23rd, the Mexican government suspended classes, forbade gatherings with more than 100 people and suspended
economic activities involving social mobility. The
main motivation to implement these measures is
that the health system can maintain its capacity
to care for the sick needing hospital treatment,
therefore containing the mortality rate.
In comparison with previous recessions in
Mexico, this crisis will have a relatively bigger
impact in employment. As a consequence of suspending work, many companies have been forced
to stop operating due to a substantial fall in the
demand of their products or due to isolation,
while others have been reorganizing to be able to
work from home, as much as possible.
Isolation means a lower demand for labor and,
most likely, the substitution of work by robots
and digital apps, a situation in which low skilled
labor is the most affected. On the other hand, the
higher skilled labor is more complementary with
technology; it is more susceptible to do be done
at a distance, may have better isolation measures,
and workers with these skills may have better
conditions to work from home. Therefore, in
Mexico, lower skilled work is the most affected
one due to social distancing.

Regarding women’s employment, the fact that
their work is more complementary with technology could affect them relatively less. Nevertheless, it has been found that, with social distancing,
women have been absorbing a higher workload
of domestic work, such as caring for children
who aren’t going to school. This relatively larger
workload could lead to a fall in women’s productivity that offsets the positive effect of higher
complementarity with technology.
On the other hand, the effect of social distancing at work will be very different depending on
the economic sector: while tourism, the entertainment industry, as well as aviation will be severely
affected in the short term, other sectors like medical services, food manufacturing and telecommunications will be favored due to the health crisis.
For more than 15 million Mexicans in the informal sector (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y
Empleo, fourth trimester, 2019), staying at home
and following the social distancing measures recommended by the government will mean not generating an income that allows them to survive day by
day. Many have to decide between being exposed
to the virus or being hungry. It is very likely that
this sector will be much more exposed to the effects
of the virus and will also suffer a decrease in their
income due to the economic crisis generated by distancing measures. The effects of the crisis will be
disproportionately higher in this economic sector.
Another challenge that the Mexican economy will face will be the return of Mexicans from
the United States, who will be affected by unemployment in that country, especially because the
health crisis affects sectors in which migrants
are traditionally employed, such as construction,
restaurants and hotels. In out-migration areas,
the return of people not only means pressure on
the local job market, but it also poses an epidemiological challenge due to risk of infection, in
places with scarce medical services. In addition,
there is a decline in remittances due to returnees,
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as well as the income decrease of migrants in the
United States.
Job loss in Mexico could also lead to many
Mexicans considering migration towards the
United States as the only way to recover an income for their families, despite the pandemic
exacerbating xenophobic reactions in the United States and the tougher border controls. This
could have the effect of stimulating irregular migration towards the north.
On the other hand, the effects of the pandemic will also generate strong pressure over the
already weak Central American economies and
their labor markets and thus, over migration. It is
very likely that migration flows towards Mexico

increase, posing a challenge for our country to
handle them without impairing migrants’ human
rights and controlling the pandemic, in an environment that fosters the intensification of anti-immigrant reactions.
The pandemic has taught us that there are no
limits to its spread and that the wellbeing of a
sector of the population depends on the wellbeing of others. Now more than ever it is necessary
to implement strategies that, while avoiding the
stigmatization of the most vulnerable population, help maintain a minimum level of wellbeing
through well-designed economic and social policies that include, among other things, unconditional transfers to those most in need.
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Migration, Inequality and COVID-19: Implications for Mexican
Immigrants in the United States*
Pia M. Orrenius | Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Madeline Zavodny | University of North Florida
Yichen Su | F ederal Reserve Bank of Dallas

While people all around the world have been hard
hit by the economic downturn resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic, immigrants are especially
vulnerable. This note explores the initial economic
impact of the pandemic on Mexican immigrants
in the United States, with a particular focus on
Texas, and discusses the key immigration-related
challenges posed for policy makers and researchers going forward.

disproportionately concentrated in sectors that
have been more affected by shutdown orders and
a collapse in demand. Families headed by a Mexican immigrant were more likely to be poor even
before COVID-19. And, as discussed next, the
fact that many Mexican immigrant families are
not eligible for the temporary expansions to the
safety net means those families will become even
worse off than other families.

Mexican immigrants in more
vulnerable industries

Relief in sight?

A large share of Mexican immigrants worked in
sectors that have largely shut down in the wake
of the pandemic, most notably restaurants. Prior
to the crisis, over 10 percent of employed Mexican immigrants were working at restaurants; in
Texas, the share was slightly smaller at about 9
percent.1 Mexican immigrants are also over-represented in construction, and many building
projects have been put on hold or scrapped as
a result of the pandemic. Most of these workers
have either been furloughed or seen their hours
drastically cut. Some Mexican immigrants work
in essential sectors that have not been adversely affected and remain employed, such as those
working in landscaping or agriculture. On the
whole, however, social distancing mandates have
proven very harmful to Hispanic immigrants. In
fact, fewer than one in eight Mexican-born workers in Texas has a job that can easily be done from
home.2
The COVID-19 pandemic and resultant economic downturn is likely to worsen the economic
status of many Mexican immigrants and exacerbate income inequality. Low-wage workers are
*

The U.S. safety net is intended to help families
who face an unexpected setback, including losing a job. The unemployment insurance system
provides payments to qualified workers who lose
a job or see their hours cut through no fault of
their own. Workers must be “covered” by the
system, however; unauthorized immigrants and
people working “off the books” are not covered.
About 43 percent of the 11.3 million Mexican
immigrants are unauthorized (4.9 million), while
the rest either hold green cards (3.5 million) or
are naturalized U.S. citizens (2.3 million).3 Less
than 5 percent have DACA (Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals) status.
The federal government expanded unemployment insurance coverage in mid-March 2020 to
include many self-employed workers (and added
a supplemental benefit of $600 per week for four
months), but it did not include unauthorized immigrants. Only legal workers—typically U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents—can receive
unemployment insurance benefits. States decide
whether to include recipients of DACA and other
similar legal statuses in the unemployment insurance program; Texas has done so.4

The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
or the Federal Reserve System.
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The other major federal relief program created in response to COVID-19—one-time cash
payments of up to $1200 per eligible adult and
$500 per child—also excludes unauthorized immigrants. Further, U.S. citizens, legal immigrants
and DACA recipients who file their federal income taxes jointly with a spouse who uses an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN)
are not eligible for the payments. ITINs are often
associated with undocumented immigrants since
people who use an ITIN typically do so because
they have no Social Security number.
While federal funds are not available to unauthorized immigrants, states can opt to fund relief
measures at their own expense. California has
been the only state thus far to announce a relief
fund for unauthorized immigrants. Texas seems
unlikely to create such a program even though it
is second only to California in its estimated number of unauthorized immigrants (some 1.6 million, including 1.1 million from Mexico).5
There are valid reasons for excluding unauthorized immigrants from many governmental
transfer programs. After all, governments do not
want to undermine the rule of law or potentially
incentivize unauthorized immigration. The extreme nature of the current situation with a pandemic and widespread mandated business closures may weaken such concerns about incentive
effects; extending some benefits to unauthorized
immigrants right now is unlikely to create expectations of similar benefits in more normal times.
Nonetheless, giving benefits to unauthorized immigrants is a tough sell politically, and perhaps
more so when many voters are facing difficult financial situations.

Hiring immigrants in the recovery
The current situation has interesting but conflicting implications for the eventual economic recovery. A major economic rationale for limiting
access to transfer programs and keeping benefit

levels relatively low is to incentivize work. The
current unprecedented supplement to unemployment benefits ($600 extra per week for 4 months)
effectively removes the incentive to work for laidoff low-wage workers. Who then will be willing to
fill the jobs at grocery stores, warehouses, delivery
services and the like created by rapidly expanding
demand in those sectors or at restaurants when
they reopen? Perhaps immigrants who are unfamiliar with the unemployment insurance system
or ineligible for benefits, some of them unauthorized. However, many of the jobs being created
right now are at large corporate chains that use the
E-Verify system to check their hires’ employment
eligibility. Whether such businesses continue to use
the E-Verify system will be interesting to see.

Agenda for policy makers and researchers
Addressing the public health threat posed by
COVID-19 is clearly the top priority for policy makers. Reducing the economic fallout from
the business shutdowns is also critical. But even
with these priorities and record federal spending
to help households and businesses, some groups
have been strategically left out.
The economic vulnerability of Mexican immigrants in particular and the exclusion of many
of them from expanded safety net programs will
result in more poverty and income inequality.
For researchers, this is an opportunity to examine how ineligible immigrants fare and shed light
on the social costs of crises among this group. It
is also an opportunity to study how immigrants
with legal residence and U.S. natives respond
to relief programs compared with workers who
are not eligible for them. For example, will immigrants who are ineligible for jobless benefits
be the first to return to work? And if not, is that
because they are thwarted by programs such as
E-Verify? The results of that research may affect
policy making as the pandemic continues and
once the recovery gets underway.
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Authors’ calculations based on March 2019 through February 2020 Current Population Survey data.
Authors’ calculations based on O*NET data applied to 2013–2017 American Community Survey data; see https://
www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2020/0407 for the U.S. and Texas more generally.
See https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states.
See https://www.nelp.org/publication/immigrant-workers-eligibility-unemployment-insurance/ and https://www.vox.
com/2020/4/1/21197017/immigrants-coronavirus-stimulus-relief-bill.
See https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/TX.
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Thoughts about some of the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
on Remittances at a World Level
Mario Hernández | Western Union

Along with seemingly every other business in
the world, Western Union has spent the last few
months considering the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on our operations, and, more importantly, on the millions of customers all over the
world who depend on us for rapid, efficient transfer of money.
Unlike most other businesses, however, Western Union has a unique perspective due to our
long history of serving distressed communities
in times of crisis; our worldwide reputation has
been built, in large part, on bringing people together when conditions are at their worst and
people need their loved ones the most. Our history of serving such needs, as well as our global reach and combination of a digital and retail
business, leaves us well positioned to spot a few
signs pointing the way forward as global migrants, our customers and our business embrace
a New Normal:
• People will still send money, and digital acceptance is only accelerating
• People sending money online expect a high
level of service, which encourages trust
• Cash and retail locations will still be needed in
many parts of the world
• The COVID-19 crisis may serve as a new call
for true financial inclusion
Western Union’s remittance business was, of
course, impacted by COVID-19, with money
sends falling in some areas. It is still too soon,
however, to clearly distinguish between business
falloff due to people sending less money vs. due
to the large-scale lockdowns that kept them from
visiting our retail Agents. At the end of April, the
World Bank forecast a 20 percent decline in remittances in 2020; while we feel that number is
pessimistic, we are expecting remittance volumes
to fall. As stay-in-place guidelines loosen and
businesses around the world reopen, it will be

easier to gauge whether people have less money
to send home and how much.
We do know that people still have a strong
desire to send money during hard times. During
the 2008 global financial crisis, for example, we
witnessed the resilience of our remittance-based
business as our customers remained highly motivated to support families and loved ones.
COVID-19 has made one overarching trend
for the remittance business clear, however: Digital transactions, particularly on the send side, are
the future. Western Union has spent years building out a digital infrastructure to match our global brick-and-mortar network, leaving us well-prepared for the surge in digital transactions we experienced as people looked for trusted, safer and
more convenient ways to send money.
Combine the rise in digital sends with our expansion of receive options—money into a bank
account or mobile wallet in more than 100
countries; near-real-time payout in 50 countries;
and our longstanding cash payout at retail locations—and it’s easy to see that for customers in
many corridors, all-digital transactions are likely
to become the status quo. The rise in the number
of digital send, digital-payout, and all-digital (on
both ends) transactions portends, we feel, a larger change in remittance behavior that we think
is good news for remitting migrants around the
world—with some important caveats.
First, while Western Union has long anticipated and fostered growth in digital transactions, we
nevertheless were caught somewhat by surprise
as so many longtime retail customers tried to use
our digital services for the first time. The level of
support they required quickly overwhelmed our
customer-service networks and we fielded complaints via social media and other means about
wait times and know-your-customer requirements. Already-worried people were frustrated as
they tried to find ways to send money to their
loved ones far away.
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Western Union responded quickly to these issues, implementing a ‘Digital Location’ program
that put a real person in touch with senders or
receivers in 10 countries who needed help; we
also beefed up our customer-care staffs with employees from other parts of the company, and
implemented an automated system to help guide
some customers through identification and other
requirements to send and receive money. Finally,
we updated our Agent Locator system three times
a day to account for constant changes in open
retail Agent locations and hours of operation.
This experience—though obviously made more
severe by the pressing send-and-receive needs presented by the pandemic—made clear something
we and many other businesses already knew:
moving customers from a retail-based experience
to a digital one is not as easy as pointing them
to a website or asking them to download an app.
When people’s health or well-being may depend
on the fast, reliable receipt of money from their
loved ones far away, stress, and expectations, rise.
Particularly when it comes to serving less-digitally
savvy populations, handling their money in a way
that leaves them feeling respected and reassured
requires more ‘touch’ than other kinds of transactions. Native language support is particularly
important.
The COVID-19 pandemic reinforced something we already knew: For all digital’s explosive
growth, and the promises of safety, convenience
and economy it brings for millions, in much of

the world there is simply no replacement for local,
brick-and-mortar Agents offering cash payouts.
As commonplace as virtual wallets and
bank-account payout have become—even in
less-developed parts of the world—they still require access to digital and financial services. As a
company that holds financial inclusion and connecting the financially underserved to the global
economy as core values, Western Union is as committed to serving a receiving customer in ‘off the
grid’ rural Central America as we are to serving
the corresponding sender, who may have online
access and a bank account, in the US. This is why
we continue to offer cash payout at more than
550,000 retail locations all around the world,
rather than only serving an easier-to-reach digital
market in the most affluent countries.
Unequal access to technology and financial services continue to hobble participation in the global economy for millions around the world; the
COVID-19 crisis is just the latest, if an especially
distressing, example. Western Union is proud to
serve customers from all geographies and walks
of life, but we know better than most that the
benefits of the digital global economy still fall
unevenly. One hopeful view of the still-unfolding
COVID-19 crisis is that it may serve as an impetus
for businesses, governments and NGOs to redouble their efforts to address this inequity and make
real financial inclusion a reality for everyone, regardless of where they live—so that when the next
crisis hits, help will be easier to send.
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Mexican Human Rights Organizations Respond to Protect Migrants
during the COVID-19 Pandemic
Gretchen Kuhner | Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración

As migrant rights organizations in Mexico analyzed the news of the coronavirus approaching at
the beginning of March, it was difficult to imagine what social distancing and “sheltering in”
would look like for migrants. In the U.S., organizations were focused on supporting immigrants
as essential workers in service and agricultural
jobs on the frontlines. However, in Mexico, the
challenge would be to provide basic protection
to migrants in transit, in detention centers, those
stuck along the southern and northern borders,
and those waiting for resolutions to their asylum
claims throughout the country. Organizations
were unsure how the U.S. and Mexico would react. Would the U.S. continue to deport Mexicans
during a pandemic, risking their health? Would
officials continue to place asylum seekers in the
Remain in Mexico Program and return them to
Mexico to await their hearings? Would Mexico
put health concerns over U.S. political pressure?
By mid-March, two weeks before Mexico declared a national health emergency, several of
the more than 200 shelters and organizations
had developed protocols to guide service provision and emergency aid throughout the pending
shutdown. Many of the shelters decided to close
their doors to new arrivals in order to protect
the current population. They also lost hundreds
of volunteers who returned home, creating staffing shortages. Larger shelters set up quarantine
sections in order to receive new migrants, including many that would be released later from the
65 detention centers in Mexico. Legal services
and community-based organizations closed their
doors and set up online consultations.
Advocacy was a different story. Approximately 40 organizations and networks constructed a
multi-pronged advocacy strategy based on international recommendations urging states to release
migrants from detention and to include all people,
irrespective of their nationality or immigration
status, in public health responses. Organizations

sent letters, signed petitions, published editorials,
and appeared in local, national and international media.1 They initiated litigation to demand the
release of migrant detainees and sent recommendations for alternatives to detention to authorities in the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as
international organizations.
By the third week in March, the policies of the
U.S. and Mexico had become clear. On March
20th, the U.S.-Mexico border was closed to
non-essential travel and the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) issued an order establishing that
all people crossing without proper documentation at, or between, ports of entry would be expelled to Mexico expeditiously or deported to
their countries of origin without due process.2
On March 22nd, the Mexican Foreign Ministry
agreed to accept all Mexicans as well as up to
100 nationals per day from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.3 The order was implemented
immediately and in the following days organizations documented as the Mexican government
bussed Central Americans to the states of Tabasco and Chiapas at the southern border and left
them stranded along highways to self-deport.4 At
the same time, instead of releasing migrants from
detention with immigration status and social assistance, the Mexican Foreign Ministry pressured
Central American governments to accept deportations. Between March 20th and April 26th, the
National Immigration Institute (INM) deported
more than 3,600 migrants, leaving 106 in migration detention.5 Shelters with quarantine capacity
received approximately 700 detainees with pending asylum cases through financial support from
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
During April, organizations continued to address emerging humanitarian needs and to monitor and document the impact of COVID-19
-related policies in Mexico. Food and sanitation
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supplies were distributed to migrants in shelters and those holed up in rooms, apartments
or homeless. When migrants in five detention
centers protested lack of sanitary conditions,
leading to the death of a Guatemalan asylum
seeker, organizations filed complaints with the
prosecutor´s office and the National Human
Rights Commission (CNDH).6 Along the northern border, shelters struggled to receive expelled
migrants as well as Mexican deportees, some of
whom were deported with COVID-19 after becoming infected in detention centers in the U.S.
More than 20,000 people under the Remain in
Mexico program had their asylum hearings postponed until at least June, leaving them in limbo in
the middle of a pandemic, with organized crime
devising new ways to exploit them.7 In the meantime, pending asylum claims increased by 33%,
with over 65,000 people now waiting for adjudications that have been suspended by the Mexican
Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR)
until further notice.8
The week of April 12th, the litigation began
to have an impact when judges issued two injunctions ordering the INM to implement public
health protocols in detention centers and to release all vulnerable migrants including children,

the elderly, pregnant women and people with underlying health conditions. One of the injunctions
issued by a federal judge in Mexico City, ordered
the INM to cease detention of vulnerable groups
during the remainder of the pandemic, to issue humanitarian visas and to provide healthcare services.9
The immediate emergency measures combined
with the longer-term documentation and litigation have undoubtably saved many lives and
placed migrant rights organizations in a position
to demand accountability for the migration policies implemented by the Interior and Foreign
Ministries throughout the pandemic in Mexico.
In the longer term, organizations will continue
to monitor the effects of the reactive migration
policies enacted by the U.S. and Mexican governments and the impact of the pandemic on migrants in general. The economic crisis in the U.S.
may lead to massive returns to Mexico as it did
between 2008-2010, while a decrease in remittances is expected to motivate further migration
from Central America. Migrant rights organizations have confirmed in the last two months that
the U.S. will use any pretext to close the border,
even in violation of its own asylum laws and at
the expense of human lives, and Mexico will continue to cower at the first provocation.
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Lessons from the Pandemic: Poverty and Social Rights in Mexico
Agustín Escobar Latapí | Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social

Poverty and vulnerability are intimately linked to
the pandemic that devastated the world in 2020.
Initially, the pandemic was brought to Mexico by
high class travelers and tourists. Nevertheless, it
mostly killed poor Mexicans who can’t pay for
private health services, keep a safe distance at
home or abstain from social interaction given
their type of work, who have faced decades of
bad nutrition that provoked a high rate of chronic diseases. Our society must exit the pandemic
with a much more robust notion of solidarity.
This new solidarity must pass the test that Ferrajoli calls, “the law of the weakest.”1 It should
strengthen the most vulnerable.
Starting in 1930, Mexico built a system of
programs and social services that mitigated inequalities. It strengthened and tended towards
universality2 in most essential services. The poorest people had access to education, health, and
other services, albeit lagging. In the liberal era
that has governed us since 1986, the balance is
mixed. Among the positive elements, resources
for health and public education increased and a
network of programs geared towards the poorest and most vulnerable was created. Among the
negative elements, the justice system became almost completely inoperative and a great deal of
basic urban services were privatized, and their
prices raised.
The system to provide these services, and to
put in place actions and programs exists, albeit imperfect. There is a law that specifically underscores the Mexican pact for social rights and
therefore, signals the course the system should
follow. I am referring to the General Law of Social Development of 2004. This is a law of consensus and sums: its overall framework was created by the Democratic Revolution Party, but all
parties contributed to it, and it was unanimously approved. That law is an example of political
success. By capturing rights; laying the groundwork for its independent study and measuring
their implementation; defining the elements of its

evaluation system; and allowing the creation of
a counsel in charge of measuring and evaluating
social development, this law gave Mexico what it
needed to make progress in prioritizing the rights
of the weakest.
From the passing of the law until 2020, the
framework of the law, the counsel created by it,3
and the joint work by the public sector and independent academics, allowed Mexico to progress
in certain clear ways, but also to detect weaknesses that must be addressed. The pandemic
must generate a reform informed by the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL, Spanish acronym)
studies and measurements oriented towards reconstructing and strengthening basic services. In
addition, a limited number of programs, designed
with a life cycle viewpoint, could notably boost
life conditions and opportunities for the poorest.
The programs only make sense if fundamental
services –in this essay I am proposing them to be
health, education, order and justice4– come close
to guaranteeing access to these rights.
The first grand action is healthcare. During the
thirties of the 20th century, after a decade of efforts to consolidate a universal public health system, the creation of the Instituto Mexicano del
Seguro Social (IMSS) and other parallel systems
segmented health services. The existence of segmentation is not necessarily destructive. But it is
fundamental to have a quality health service for
those with the least means. The INSABI (Health
for Wellbeing Institute, the present day universal
health care system) does not fulfill that objective.
Its inoperability during the pandemic has been evident. It also lacks the design elements needed for
a segmented system to work. The Seguro Popular
(program with similar objectives of past regimes)
had deficiencies:5 there was no accountability for
resources that should have been for state level
health ministries and, in some cases, the public
bids were corrupt; but its design is much better
than INSABI, as well as its results. It is necessary
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to refinance and rebuild the system. In order to
do that, there are international regulations that
cover from the basic medical consultation protocols, through the transparent accreditation of
clinics, and the definition of the amount of beds
and medical staff required per population size.
The Mexican government’s inaction in the deterioration of public health and health services is unacceptable. Blaming the population for its co-morbidity during the pandemic makes the State evade
its responsibility over health. Rescuing health service capacities is essential, as well as people having healthy behaviors. The latter is achieved with
education (which includes early nutrition, clean
water in schools and real physical education), with
salaries, which has advanced greatly in the past
four years, and with an effective regulation of nutrition systems. The Mexican population’s terrible
health condition (diabetes II, high blood pressure
and obesity) is not a final curse. It is our social
construct and it can be overcome.
The second action item is education. Mexican

education is very deficient. A wide group of specialists must redesign the system, which should
emphasize self-health care and must really be
functional in a context where distance learning
will become a permanent part of the system.
The third action item consists of the interaction
of property, order and justice. The poor people’s
living conditions can be explained in part by their
lack of access to these three rights. Their lack of
property isn’t only due to lack of resources, but
also to the bureaucratic labyrinths they face. The
perverse combination of lack of access to property and to justice, in a context of overcrowding
and terrible living quarters, partly explain their
susceptibility in the pandemic.
Once the mentioned social rights have been
taken care of, and efficient systems safeguarded
through working services are in place, economic
and social gaps can be taken care of through specific programs that prevent the law of the strongest from being prevalent in Mexico, and that,
instead, substantially reduce inequality.
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Luigi Ferrajoli, (coord.), Derecho y garantías, la ley del más débil (Madrid: Trotta, 1999).
Universality was never achieved.
Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy
The General Law of Social Development was negotiated and approved in 2004, after a long period of decreasing incidents of violence in Mexico. I consider that that’s why property, order and justice are not mentioned. Violence and crime
started to rise in 2007. If that law were to be updated, my proposal would be that these rights be included as social
rights. Mexico’s poor are much poorer and more vulnerable because their access to these rights does not exist.
See Agustín Escobar Latapí and Mercedes González de la Rocha (forthcoming), Acceso efectivo al desarrollo social:
necropsia y lecciones de dos acciones públicas, (Ciudad de México: CIESAS).
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Pandemic as Pretext: How the Trump Administration is
Using a Public Health Crisis to End the Right to Asylum
Susan Gzesh | University of Chicago

The characterization of immigrants and refugees
as “diseased” has a long history in the United
States. In 1917, U.S. immigration authorities began a decades-long regime of “disinfecting” Mexican workers entering at land borders, using toxic substances. In the early 20th century, working
class immigrants from Asia and Eastern & Southern Europe were strictly inspected for “loathsome
or dangerous” diseases, while first-class passengers were not.1 In the 1990s, Haitians fleeing a
murderous regime were suspected of carrying
HIV/AIDs and diverted to a camp in Guantanamo, Cuba. Those who qualified for asylum were
only allowed into the U.S. when a federal court
ordered release from their off-shore “AIDS prison.” 2 Now the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a pretext for the Trump Administration to
implement some of its most extreme measures
against people fleeing repression and violence –
whose rights to non-refoulement are protected by
U.S. law and international human rights.
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has enacted increasingly draconian measures to deter,
block, or restrict access by asylum seekers and
refugees. The quota of refugees lawfully admitted from overseas was drastically cut. A travel
ban was enacted against any entrants from certain countries (mostly Muslim). Trump’s advisors
implemented a “detention as deterrence” policy
against asylum seekers who had no alternative
to entering the U.S. clandestinely or making their
pleas at a land-border crossing. Immigration authorities first stuffed migrant families into cages
in freezing border stations and then filled detention centers with asylum seekers. The Administration cruelly separated migrant children from
their parents, tried to overturn judicially-mandated protections for unaccompanied youth,
limited (“metered”) claims accepted at border
crossings, sent claimants back into Mexico to
await decisions, and attempted by regulation
to bar any claim for asylum from unauthorized

migrants who enter through the U.S.-Mexico
border and had not applied for asylum in Mexico. While some of these initiatives have been halted or limited by U.S. courts, many of them are
still in place.3
Mexico has been complicit with Trump’s initiatives. Under economic pressure, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s government blocks and deports asylum seekers traveling through Mexico.
Mexico has also accepted the return to its territory of Central American asylum seekers who made
claims at the U.S. border. Under the so-called
“Migrant Protection Protocols” over 50,000 applicants were to wait for their U.S. hearings in
Mexico in conditions which threaten their lives.4
Now the COVID-19 pandemic has given the
Trump Administration a pretext to stop asylum
claims at the U.S.-Mexico border and increase
pressure on asylum applicants already in the interior of the U.S. The Trump Administration has
suspended the hearings in the MPP cases, but
will not allow MPP applicants to wait in the U.S.
In U.S. cities with “stay at home” orders, other
asylum applicants and their lawyers have been
forced to show up for interviews and immigration court hearings, although non-essential functions in almost all other U.S. courts have been
suspended. Attorney organizations and immigration court judges and staff have sued to protest
this health risk.5 The multiple pressures to make
asylum seekers give up their claims are particularly cruel violations of the fundamental right to
non-refoulement under U.S. law and treaties ratified by the U.S. and Mexico.6
Immigration detention centers, including the
more humane “shelters” for immigrant children,
have become “hot spots” of COVID-19 infections,
threatening the lives of both internees and staff.7
Advocates from the National Immigrant Justice Center, the American Civil Liberties Union,
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and other NGOs, supported by Democrats in Congress,
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have been unable to get a blanket release policy for asylum seekers from the Department of
Homeland Security. Lawyers have sought to free
detainees from ICE custody through time-consuming individual or group habeas corpus lawsuits in federal court. Some actions have been successful while others have not. Increasingly judges
are sympathetic to detainees’ plight and have ordered release, including children protected by the
long-standing Flores court order.8 On April 20,
2020, federal Judge Jesus Bernal issued a preliminary order on behalf of all ICE detainees that ICE
begin reviewing the necessity for the detention of
all detainees with COVID-19 risk factors and institute measures to protect all ICE detainees from
infection by April 30, 2020.9 If the Trump Administration continues to oppose alternatives to
detention (electronic monitoring or other forms
of supervised release) for asylum seekers, history
may judge that the Administration turned facilities detaining asylum seekers and other migrants
into death campus.
In a further expansion of disease-based exclusions, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
issued a new regulation which cited over-crowded detention conditions (that the Department of
Homeland Security created) as the rationale for
immediate expulsion. The order “suspend[s] the
introduction of certain persons” arriving at the
Mexican or Canadian border, who likely would
be placed in “congregate settings” where they
would be “held in close proximity.” The order
targets those who arrive by land, without valid
travel documents. Instead of detaining them and
allowing them the opportunity mandated in immigration law to express a “credible fear” of persecution, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
agents are directed to interrogate encountered

persons in the field, to bypass normal immigration processing (which would entail detention),
and expel them as rapidly as possible to “the
country from which they came or their home
country.” The CDC order and an accompanying
leaked CBP memo do not allow any consideration
of claims for political asylum and make an exception only for a person who manages to make
“an affirmative, spontaneous, and reasonably believable claim that they will be tortured…” Execution of the order by CBP will violate U.S. law
and international treaties including the Refugee
Protocol and the Convention Against Torture.10
There are ways to protect public health in
the U.S. without a complete exclusion of asylum
seekers. Applicants could be interviewed under
safe-distancing conditions or by remote means,
tested for COVID-19 and quarantined under
humanitarian conditions if necessary. Healthy
asylum seekers could be released under bond or
with electronic monitoring, pending resolution
of their cases. One of the worst ironies of stigmatizing Central American asylum seekers as
disease bearers is that Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras did not have the coronavirus until
it was imported from the United States through
deportations.11
It is the Trump Administration’s detention and
deterrence policies that created a public health
crisis among asylum seekers which the government now seeks to use as a pretext for barring
desperate people. International human rights
treaties allow for some restrictions of rights
during a “state of emergency,” but rights limitations should be strictly tailored to the emergency
as necessary and effective. Certain rights, such as
the right to be free from torture and the right to
life are never to be restricted.12
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Migration and Mobility in an Age of Pandemic
James F. Hollifield | Southern Methodist University

International migration has been steadily increasing since the end of the Second World War. In
2019, approximately 272 million people resided
outside of their country of birth for one year or
more (barely 3.5 percent of the world’s population).1 Until the global pandemic of 2020, tens
of millions of people crossed borders on a daily basis, which added up to roughly two billion
border crossings per year. Human mobility was
part of a broader trend of globalization, including trade in goods and services, investments and
capital flows, greater ease of travel, and a veritable explosion of information. The COVID-19
pandemic puts all of these trends into question, as
states move to close their borders and to stop migration in its tracks, posing the biggest challenge
to the international ‘liberal’ order since the 1930s
and the Second World War. Could the pandemic
be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, putting
an end to roughly seventy years of globalization,
and bringing down the international liberal order itself? The legal and institutional edifice of
globalization was under stress even before the
pandemic. Now, however, reactionary populist
politicians, like Donald Trump, are moving even
faster further to undermine the foundations of
the global order.
Like trade and foreign investment, migration
has been a defining feature of globalization, and
until the pandemic of 2020 human mobility was
taken for granted, especially in the wealthier
(OECD) countries of the northern hemisphere.
Migration and mobility were in many ways connected to trade and investment, yet they are profoundly different. People are not shirts, which is
another way of saying that labor is not a pure
commodity. Unlike goods and capital, individuals
become actors on the international stage whether
through peaceful transnational communities or
violent terrorist and criminal networks. Migration and mobility can be a threat to the security of states, and during a time of pandemic, the
movement of people can endanger public health.

This is especially true when foreign workers are
concentrated in production-line work (like meatpacking in the United States) or confined in dormitories, in crowded conditions and closed quarters, as in Singapore and in the oil sheikdoms of
the Persian Gulf.
Yet migration is vital for human and economic
development, and it reduces global inequalities.2
Essential industries like healthcare and food production rely heavily on immigrant labor, skilled
and unskilled, while remittances remain a vital
source of foreign exchange and investment in
many developing countries. Immigrants bring
much needed labor and human capital, new ideas
and cultures, and in liberal democracies, they
come with a basic package of (human and civil)
rights that enables them to settle and become productive members of society. Conversely, they may
return to their countries of origin where they can
have a dramatic impact on economic and political
development.3
Foreign workers (documented and undocumented) and refugees play a vital role in essential
services in the fight against COVID-19, whether in health care, agriculture and food processing, transportation, delivery, freight, and cargo.
Even Trump with his emphasis on nativist and
beggar-thy-neighbor policies, chose to exempt
seasonal and farm labor from his immigration
ban, recognizing that US food supplies are dependent on continued access to foreign labor. Trump
also invoked the Defense Production Act to order
meatpacking plants to remain open despite high
levels of infection among the largely immigrant
workforce.
Not all migration is voluntary – in any given
year, tens of millions of people move to escape
political violence, hunger, and deprivation, becoming refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced persons. In 2019, the number of “persons
of concern” to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was 70.8 million, including 26
million refugees, 3.5 million asylum seekers, and
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41.3 million internally displaced people. Wars in
the Middle East (especially Syria and Iraq), East
and West Africa, and instability in South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Central (Northern
Triangle) and South America (Venezuela) continue
to feed a growing population of forced migrants.
Because it is so complex and multi-faceted, migration of all types poses a challenge for nation-states,
for regions like the European Union and North
America, and for the international community
as a whole (Hollifield and Foley forthcoming).4
These populations are incredibly exposed, highly
vulnerable to infection, and with little access to
basic sanitation and health care.
The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened
the hand of populist leaders, like Donald Trump,
Matteo Salvini, and Victor Orban, who want to
close their societies to migrants and refugees,
ignoring the rule of law and international legal
commitments under the refugee convention. The
‘defection’ of the United States in particular from
multilateral organizations, like the WHO, will accelerate beggar-thy-neighbor policies, making international cooperation to combat the pandemic
far more difficult, prolonging human suffering,
and increasing global inequalities.
America First and the ‘End of Liberalism’
In the first three years of his administration, President Donald Trump made good on his campaign
pledges. He issued executive orders banning immigrants and visitors from many Muslim-majority countries. He focused on border security,
illegally reallocating funds from the defense budget to extend the border wall—a hugely symbolic
move for his electoral base. He slashed the number of refugees allowed into the U.S and made
every effort to stop asylum seeking along the
southern border. As a deterrence, he authorized
the separation of migrant families at the border,
ripping small children from the arms of their parents, eventually striking a deal with Mexico to
push back all asylum seekers at the border, without giving them a hearing—a flagrant violation
of international law. The COVID-19 pandemic
has allowed Trump to consolidate his nativist
agenda, effectively sealing the southern border,
while suspending refugee admissions as well as

legal immigration, the latter for a period of sixty
days.5 US consulates worldwide stopped issuing
visas on 20 March 2020.
Trump’s immigration and refugee policy is
couched in ‘civilizational’ terms6, pitting Christians and Jews against Muslims and Mexicans/
Hispanics against whites and blacks. With the
economic implosion and soaring unemployment
in the wake of the pandemic, Trump has vowed
to close the US labor market to immigrants to
‘save American jobs.’ The pandemic has created a
perfect storm of cultural, economic, and security
threats in the U.S. At the domestic level, the nativist policy shift contributes to an environment of
intolerance and intimidation in which hate crimes
have increased,7 giving succor to violent, rightwing, extremist groups. At the international level,
Trump’s beggar-thy-neighbor policies have alienated allies and stifled international cooperation.
Trump is making US foreign and security
policy through naked appeals to nationalism,
racism, and xenophobia, ignoring long-term national interests, and undermining multilateralism.
Symbolic politics is the order of the day. While
nationalism and scapegoating migrants and refugees appeal directly to Trump’s base and are a vital part of his 2020 reelection strategy, long-term
foreign policy and security interests are sacrificed
for the short-term electoral high that comes from
nationalism, nativism and symbolic politics. The
need for allies and international cooperation to
combat COVID-19 and for practical solutions to
refugee and humanitarian crises is off the foreign
policy agenda, and the defection of the U.S. from
multilateral regimes weakens the global order.

Conclusion
Migration is both a cause and a consequence of
political and economic change, and, like trade, it
is a fundamental feature of the postwar liberal
order. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led
states to close their borders, disrupting supply
chains, and severely curtailing migration and mobility. If the pandemic leads to further closure of
societies and economies and to more nationalism,
the international system will descend into greater
anarchy, disorder and war. Human and economic development will suffer and global inequalities
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will rise. The more powerful states, like the U.S.
and China, will set the trend for the rest of the
world, and in both states, nationalism has surged

to the fore, setting the stage for more conflict as
new power blocs emerge and international cooperation recedes.
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